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Abstract:  
In an electricity system, demand and supply have to be balanced in real time. Since most energy is traded 
before real time already in forward, day-ahead and intraday markets imbalances can occur. To ensure 
the balance between demand and supply even if power plants deviate from their schedules, the system 
operator procures balancing capacity and energy in balancing markets. The market outcomes may 
significantly differ from one country to the other depending on the underlying generation technologies 
and market design. In this paper, we have a look at the balancing market prices of a hydro-dominated 
electricity system using Switzerland as a case study. By using a short-term hydropower operation model 
and a set of Swiss hydropower plants, we are able to identify a competitive benchmark for Swiss 
balancing market prices defined by the opportunity costs of hydropower for providing balancing 
capacity. Our results show that Swiss balancing market prices are influenced by several drivers but do 
not hint at any market imperfections. 
 
Key words:  hydropower; cross-market optimization; balancing; Switzerland 
  
 2 
1 Introduction 
In an electricity system, physical electricity demand and supply have to be balanced in real time to keep 
the frequency and thereby the overall system stable. Since most energy is traded before real time already 
in forward, day-ahead and intraday markets imbalances can occur in real time by deviations from the 
power plant schedules or demand forecast errors. To ensure the system balance, balancing capacity and 
energy are procured by the transmission system operators (TSOs) in the balancing markets. On the 
supply side, the same firms active on the energy market are also the ones providing balancing capacity 
and energy. In a system with a high share of conventional power plants like Germany, most of the 
balancing supply is thus provided by conventional plants. Accordingly, prices for balancing capacity 
and energy are mostly defined by the cost structures of those conventional power plants. In a system 
with a high share of renewable energies, however, balancing requirements are also provided by 
renewable energies. Since renewable technologies are dependent on natural circumstances like weather 
or hydrology but have variable cost of zero or close to zero, balancing prices can differ from 
conventional systems (Ocker, 2017; Ocker et al., 2016). In addition, renewable energies may have an 
impact on the need of balancing service requirements (Hirth and Ziegenhagen, 2015).  
In this paper, we analyze the historical balancing market prices of a hydro-dominated electricity system. 
By taking Switzerland and its secondary reserve (Sekundärregelleistung, SRL) market as a case study, 
we derive a competitive benchmark for the balancing market prices for an electricity system with a high 
share of hydropower. To do so, we use a short-term hydropower operation model and apply it to a set 
of Swiss hydropower plants and cascades. By starting with a simplified basic model and extending it by 
short-term trading options, technical plant characteristics (i.e., head effects) and uncertainty in the day-
ahead market prices, we are able to identify drivers of the opportunity cost of hydropower for providing 
balancing capacity and thus the balancing market prices in a hydro-dominated system. Our results show 
that the opportunity costs are mainly driven by cascade structures and the size of the balancing market 
bid. In addition, our results show that short-term trading options, head effects (in this paper understood 
as the dependence of hydropower unit’s efficiency on the variation in the head of the reservoir and the 
discharge, see e.g., Conejo et al., 2002) as well as uncertainty in market prices all can have an impact 
on the overall costs for providing balancing capacity.  
Comparing the costs of hydropower for providing balancing capacity with the observed balancing 
market prices leads us to the conclusion that Swiss balancing market prices and their seasonal dynamic 
are justified by the characteristics of the hydro dominated system. These findings add to the assessment 
of revenue opportunities for Swiss hydropower in Schillinger et al. (2017). Given the direct linkage of 
energy market based opportunity costs with the balancing prices in Switzerland, companies should not 
be able to extract significant additional income from balancing provision on average. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in section 2, we summarize literature on balancing 
markets. In section 3, the model and data used in this paper are explained. In section 4, the opportunity 
costs of hydropower for providing balancing capacity are illustrated. Section 5 discusses the results and 
concludes. 
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2 Balancing Markets and Hydropower in the Literature 
Literature on balancing markets is diverse. Since balancing market are still highly heterogeneous across 
countries (see, e.g., Ocker et al., 2016) a lot of studies address the different national balancing market 
designs (e.g., Müsgens et al., 2014; Ocker, 2017), the harmonization of market designs (e.g., Dallinger 
et al., 2018; Ocker et al., 2018a), the integration of balancing markets (e.g., Farahmand and Doorman, 
2012) or whether the market design is suitable for participation of variable renewable energies (VRE, 
e.g., Fernandes et al., 2016). Regarding VRE, other studies focus on the interaction of an increasing 
share of VRE and the balancing requirements and costs (e.g., Gianfreda et al., 2018; Hirth and 
Ziegenhagen, 2015; Holttinen et al., 2011; Ocker and Ehrhart, 2017) or hydropower’s ability and value 
in contributing to balance an increasing share of VRE (e.g., Dujardin et al., 2017; Graabak et al., 2019). 
Literature directly related to our study deals with balancing market auctions in terms of the bidding 
behaviour of market actors and the resulting balancing market prices. Kirsch and Singh (1995) analyse 
efficiency properties and incentives of different auction formats for ancillary services. They show that 
only uniform pricing auctions, which minimize revealed social costs, are efficient. Just and Weber 
(2008) analyse the German balancing market to derive the underlying bidding logic and prices from the 
trade-off between balancing and spot markets accounting for the opportunity cost structure and unit 
commitment conditions. Rammerstorfer and Wagner (2009) study the policy reform of the German 
balancing market in 2006 and its impact on the balancing price dynamics. The reform included an 
auction based on a merit order, a reduction of the minimum bid quantity, a limitation in the extent of 
self-selling, and new disclosure requirements. According to their results, the reform led to a decrease in 
price level and volatility and an increase in the degree of integration between spot and balancing market. 
Heim and Goetz (2013) study price increases in the German balancing market by having a look at the 
market structure and bidding strategies. They find evidence that increase in balancing prices resulted 
from collusive behaviour and show that pay-as-bid auctions do not necessarily reduce strategic 
behaviour like capacity withholding or collusion building. Müsgens et al. (2014) study the economics 
and design of the German balancing markets. Their results show that both scoring and settlement rules 
as well as rational bidding ensures simultaneous efficiency of balancing and spot markets.  
Ocker (2017) analyse seven European balancing market auctions by first theoretically describing the 
optimal bidding strategies (i.e., profit maximizing bids) for each market and second, empirically testing 
if the optimal bidding strategies can be observed in reality. However, in five out of seven markets, the 
theoretic predictions do not match the empirical data. Empirical results for Switzerland especially 
highlight the high volatility of the balancing market prices resulting from the hydro-dominated 
electricity system in Switzerland. Empirical results for Germany by Ocker and Ehrhart (2017) show that 
balancing suppliers coordinate on a price level which is higher than the competitive level and that 
suppliers take into account previous auctions prices in their bids. Due to the mismatch between empirical 
auction results and theoretic predictions, Ocker et al. (2018b) further analyse deviations from optimal 
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bidding strategies in the German and Austrian balancing markets. By taking into account price 
expectations based on historic market outcomes in their theoretical model, they formulate a theoretical 
bidding strategy, which matches empirical balancing market results in these markets. Built upon this, 
Ocker et al. (2018a) analyse if a change from pay-as-bid to uniform pricing as proposed by the European 
Commission would incentivise suppliers to reveal their true costs. However, their results show that under 
both pricing regimes (i.e., pay-as-bid and uniform pricing) suppliers do not reveal their actual cost.  
Regarding the role of hydropower in balancing markets, Gebrekiros et al. (2013) analyse the bidding of 
hydropower units. By having a look at the Norwegian market, they determine the bidding price for 
balancing capacity based on the opportunity costs in the day-ahead market. By taking into account the 
discharge-power output relationship of hydro units, they show that deviations from optimal operating 
points due to balancing provision will reduce profit. This loss in profit represents the cost for balancing 
capacity of hydro units. Similar to Gebrekiros et al. (2013), Aasgard and Roti (2016) study the 
opportunity-cost-pricing of different types of balancing products for a hydropower system. Their results 
show that for the Norwegian balancing products especially spinning reserve (primary and secondary 
reserves) can be costly to provide by hydropower plants since they can significantly restrict the 
production schedule. In addition, they show that symmetric products (i.e., primary reserves in the 
Norwegian market) are more expensive due to additional restrictions for hydropower plants resulting 
from the symmetric nature of the product.    
Additional studies, which have a look at hydropower and balancing markets, analyse the profit potential 
of balancing markets from a hydropower perspective. Examples of such studies are Chazarra et al. 
(2016), Fodstad et al. (2018) and Schillinger et al. (2017). Chazarra et al. (2016) present a detailed 
optimization model to derive the optimal generation schedule of a hydropower cascade that maximizes 
its profit on the Spanish energy and balancing markets. Their results show that hydropower can 
significantly increase its income when selling in the day-ahead and balancing market compared to pure 
day-ahead market participation. Similarly, Fodstad et al. (2018) find a theoretical potential for added 
value when selling energy in multiple markets relative to day-ahead sales only. Their results for market 
data from Norway, Sweden and Germany show that especially flexible plants can benefit from multi 
market participation. Schillinger et al. (2017) find a similar result for Swiss hydropower. While there 
might be a significant potential for additional revenues by balancing markets in theory, the authors 
highlight the limitations of such additional incomes resulting from uncertainties and balancing market 
characteristics.  
With this paper, we contribute to the above stated literature by investigating balancing market prices 
and the relation between energy and balancing markets for an electricity system dominated by 
hydropower instead of conventional (fossil fuel) technologies. So far only a limited number of studies 
focused on hydropower dominated systems and the Swiss system is rarely considered in literature. In 
this paper, we use a similar approach as Gebrekiros et al. (2013) and Aasgard and Roti (2016) to derive 
opportunity cost prices for balancing capacity but focus on the Swiss electricity market and the Swiss 
balancing market design.  
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3 Modelling Framework 
Following we will shortly describe the underlying model structure and respective adjustments to account 
for different market and technical aspects of hydropower as well as the underlying dataset for the 
estimation of the Swiss case study. 
3.1 Model 
Participation in the balancing markets changes the optimal generation schedule of power plants on the 
spot market due to the requirement to ramp up or down on short notice if called up for balancing 
provision. Because of this, balancing market prices can be derived from the opportunity cost of power 
plants on the spot market (see, e.g., Aasgard and Roti, 2016; Gebrekiros et al., 2013; Just and Weber, 
2008; Müsgens et al., 2014; Ocker et al., 2018b). In this paper, we focus on the opportunity costs for 
balancing capacity of a hydropower dominated electricity system. To that end, we use a short-term 
hydropower operation model to derive the optimal generation schedule for hydropower plants on the 
spot market as well as deviations from this schedule due to balancing market participation. The example 
in Figure 1 shows the basic logic of the approach used in this paper assuming a symmetric balancing 
market. 
 
 
Figure 1: Basic logic of the opportunity cost approach for symmetric balancing provision 
 
On the spot market (Figure 1, left panel), a profit maximizing storage hydropower plant only produces 
in the high price hours since it is limited in terms of available energy by the water stored in the reservoir. 
How much it can produce in such high price hours is furthermore constrained by the turbine capacity 
which is assumed to be 100MW for the example. If the hydropower plant is now bidding 10MW in the 
symmetric balancing market in addition to spot market participation, it has to adopt its spot market 
generation schedule accordingly (Figure 1, right panel). First, the hydropower plant has to run with at 
least at 10MW in each hour of the underlying tendering period (i.e. similar to a baseload power plant) 
in order to be able to reduce its generation output by 10MW if negative energy is requested by the TSO. 
Second, the hydropower plant can only sell 90MW instead of 100MW in high price hours in order to 
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reserve 10MW for the case that positive energy is needed to balance the system. These changes in the 
generation schedule reflect the requirements of a weekly symmetric balancing market like the SRL 
market in Switzerland. The difference in revenues obtained on the spot market between the two 
generation schedules represent the opportunity cost for providing balancing capacity (Aasgard and Roti, 
2016; Gebrekiros et al., 2013).  
In this paper, we analyse this opportunity costs in relation to the actual balancing market prices. By 
starting with a basic hydropower operation model and extending it to include short-term trading, 
technical plant details (i.e., the head effect) and price uncertainty we are able to identify the drivers of 
opportunity costs for a set of Swiss hydropower plants. Due to computational limitations, we only have 
a look at the individual effect of these drivers on the opportunity cost rather than a combination of these 
effects.  
The model details are described in the following subsections. All model versions have a resolution of 
one hour (15 minutes if the intraday market is considered) and are solved for a time horizon of one week. 
This setting is solved for each week of the year. The weekly structure is a consequence of the 
computationally demanding solution process when taking into account technical plant characteristics 
and uncertainties. For those model versions only a weekly horizon was solvable. The basic model as 
well as the short-term trading model could also be solved on yearly basis. However, for the sake of 
comparability, those model versions are also solved on a weekly basis. 
By solving the model for a weekly instead of a yearly time horizon small deviations from the yearly 
optimal generation schedule can occur (see Appendix A3.1). Due to the limited foresight when solving 
the model on a weekly time horizon, the future value of water needs to be taken into account. This water 
value is usually derived from long-term models (see, e.g., Gebrekiros et al., 2013). In our case, we derive 
the water values from a simplified yearly hydropower operation model. All models are coded in GAMS 
25.1.3 and solved using the CPLEX 12.8 solver. 
3.1.1 Basic Model 
The basic model represents a simplification of the model described in Schillinger et al. (2017). While in 
Schillinger et al. (2017) balancing market aspects are explicitly modeled, we just consider deviations in 
the spot market schedule due to balancing market participation in this model to obtain the opportunity 
costs. The basic model assumes perfect foresight and neglects technical characteristics like head effects. 
Thus, our model is deterministic and linear. 
The objective of the plant operator is to maximize its weekly revenue in the day-ahead market 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 
defined by the exogenous day-ahead market price 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 and the generation 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 of each turbine 𝑖𝑖. To take 
into account the future value of water, the storage level in 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒,𝑟𝑟 and the water value 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒,𝑟𝑟 for each 
reservoir 𝑟𝑟 at the end of the week 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 are taken into account. Deviations which occur when solving the 
basic model on a weekly instead of a yearly time horizon are illustrated in the Appendix (A3.1). max𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = �𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 +  �𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒,𝑟𝑟
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒,𝑟𝑟 
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The generation of each turbine is defined by the production equivalent (i.e., the water to energy 
conversion factor) 𝜂𝜂 and the water which is discharged through the turbine 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖. In the basic model, no 
head effects are considered so 𝜂𝜂 is assumed to be constant.  
𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 = 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖        ∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖 
The storage level in each hour for each reservoir is defined by the storage level of the previous hour, the 
natural water inflows into the reservoir 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟, the water which is going out of the reservoir either by 
discharging 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 or spilling 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 to the reservoir below 𝑖𝑖, and the water which is ending up in the 
reservoir by discharge or spill from a turbine above the reservoir 𝑖𝑖. Water delay within a cascade is not 
considered in this paper.  
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟 =  𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1,𝑟𝑟 + 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟 − � 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 − � 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 + � 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟  + � 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟         ∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟 
The generation of each turbine is constrained by the turbine capacity 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 as well as the minimum 
generation level 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒. In our case the minimum generation is assumed to be zero; i.e. we do not assume 
any residual water restrictions, neither by minimum generation nor by spilling requirements. 
𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒  ≤ 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 ≤  𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚       ∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖 
If a hydropower plant bids capacity 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 into the weekly symmetric SRL market, it has to run at least 
at that capacity level at all hours of the week in order to be able to reduce its generation in case negative 
balancing energy is requested by the TSO. In addition, the difference between the turbine capacity and 
the capacity offered has to remain free to be able to increase generation if positive energy is needed to 
balance the system. If a whole cascade is bid into the balancing market, this constraint accounts for the 
total cascade generation and not the generation of the individual plants. 
𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒  +  𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 ≤ 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 ≤  𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 −  𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠         ∀𝑡𝑡 
In order to be able to deliver what was bid into the balancing market in terms of energy, water has to be 
reserved in the reservoir. As the actual call up in case of system deviations is unknown beforehand, we 
assume that the operator runs a zero risk strategy and ensures that it can always provide sufficient energy 
assuming the worst case that it is fully called up in each hour if bidding into the balancing market (see 
Schillinger et al. (2017) for an assessment of the risk-benefit trade-off when this assumption is relaxed). 
Especially in times of a low storage level, this restriction can translate into altered plant operation in the 
week(s) before the actual bidding into the balancing market takes place; i.e. the storage at the end of the 
week before the actual bidding takes place has to keep enough water such that the plant is able to run at 
the offered capacity level for the whole week for which balancing capacity was bid and at the same time 
is able to increase its generation by the offered capacity (i.e., 2 ∗  𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠). As the reservoir gets natural 
water inflows in the future 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒, the required storage level is corrected by that amount. In case of a 
hydropower cascade, we assume that just the biggest storage reservoir of the cascade (𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) has to fulfil 
this storage constraint. 
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𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒,𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟  ≥  (2 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠)𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 −  𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒        ∀𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 
In the week for which balancing capacity was bid into the SRL market, the storage level has to be big 
enough to increase the generation by the offered capacity for the remaining time of the week taking into 
account the future inflows of the week. 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟  ≥  𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 (𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 − 𝑡𝑡) −  𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒        ∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 
In addition to the storage constraints resulting from balancing market participation, the storage is 
constrained by its minimum and maximum storage level. 
𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟 ≤  𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚        ∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟 
The storage level in the first hour is given either by historic data, if it is the first week of the year, or by 
the storage end level of the previous week, in any other week of the year. 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡=1,𝑟𝑟 =  𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡        ∀𝑟𝑟 
To derive the opportunity cost for providing balancing capacity in a specific week, we first run the model 
for each week of the year while the plant or cascade is optimized on the day-ahead market only. Second, 
we run the model for each week of the year while for the week in question a specific capacity level is 
bid into the balancing market and the corresponding generation schedule for the day-ahead market of 
this and all other weeks of the year has to be adopted. By comparing the yearly revenue without and 
with balancing market participation in a specific week, we are able to calculate the opportunity costs of 
that week by the yearly revenue difference. 
3.1.2 Short-term trading options  
In our basic model, we only consider energy trade on the day-ahead market. However, as storage 
hydropower plants are highly flexible technologies they are also traded on shorter-term markets like 
intraday markets. This can change the generation schedules and revenues of hydropower (see, e.g., 
Fodstad et al., 2018) and correspondingly the opportunity cost for providing balancing capacity. 
Therefore, we extend the basic model by taking into account trade on the intraday market in addition to 
the day-ahead market. The objective of the hydropower plant operator is thus to maximize its revenues 
over both markets 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷+𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷 while generation is split between the day-ahead 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷  and the intraday market 
𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷. max𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷+𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷 = �𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷  + �𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷  + �𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇,𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑇𝑇,𝑟𝑟 
All other equations and constraints remain similar as in the basic model. However, since the intraday 
market uses 15-minutes products, the model resolution when taking into account intraday markets is 15 
minutes instead of one hour. 
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3.1.3 Technical plant characteristics  
In the basic model, technical plant characteristics are simplified. One major limitation of the basic model 
is that it ignores the three-dimensional relationship between power produced, water discharge and head 
of the reservoir (in this paper summarized under the term head effects). However, taking into account 
head effects can have an impact on the optimal generation schedule (Conejo et al., 2002). Therefore, we 
extend the basic model by taking into account those head effects. Following the literature, head effects 
can be considered in several ways, e.g., by nonlinear programming (see, e.g., Pérez-Díaz et al., 2010). 
In this paper, we follow the approach of Conejo et al. (2002) who uses mixed integer programming 
(MIP) to approximate the head effects. Figure 2 illustrates the approach. 
 
  
Figure 2: Efficiency curve and power-discharge relationship for different head levels 
 
The left hand side of Figure 2 shows the turbine efficiency in relation to the water discharged for one 
head level. This nonlinear relationship is approximated by a piecewise linear power-discharge curve 
(right hand side of Figure 2). Furthermore, the efficiency level depends on the head level (i.e. how much 
water is in the storage reservoir). For simplification a predefined number of head levels is modeled 
instead of a continuous relation and for each head level, a power-discharge curve is defined. Following 
Conejo et al. (2002) a small number of such curves is already enough to accurately model head 
variations. As illustrated in Figure 2, turbine efficiency is highest at discharge levels lower than the 
maximum discharge and a decrease in head level reduces the overall power output. The detailed model 
is provided in the Appendix (A1.1).  
3.1.4 Uncertainty in day-ahead market prices  
Another limitation of our basic model is that it assumes perfect foresight. Thus, no uncertainties 
regarding electricity prices or inflows are considered. However, taking into account such uncertainties 
can have an impact on the scheduling decision of the hydropower plant operator (see, e.g., Ladurantaye 
et al., 2009). To analyze the impact of uncertainty on the opportunity costs, we extend our basic model 
to a stochastic version in which day-ahead prices are represented by a scenario tree. Uncertainty of 
inflows are not considered. The scenario tree structure is illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Weekly scenario tree for uncertainty in day-ahead market prices 
 
The scenario tree corresponds to a time horizon of one week, while a week is divided in seven stages, 
each corresponding to a day of the week. At each stage (excluding the last stage) the hydropower 
operator has to make a production decision for a day without knowing the exact market prices of that 
day. At the first node (n=1), for example, the plant operator decides how much to produce at the first 
day. With a certain probability, the market prices can be high or low. Depending on the realized prices 
a specific node is reached at the next stage. If, for example, prices are high at day 1 node 2 (n=2) will 
be reached in the next stage (Ladurantaye et al., 2009). The detailed weekly stochastic model is provided 
in the Appendix (A1.2).  
To also take into account price uncertainty in the long term price development and thereby the value of 
water kept in the storage by the end of the week, a yearly stochastic model is used to derive the expected 
future water values. Due to the time intensive solution process when taking into account price 
uncertainty, the yearly stochastic model considers price uncertainty only on a monthly basis. Thus, the 
yearly stochastic model is based on a scenario tree with 12 stages while each stage belongs to a month 
of the year. With a certain probability (see chapter 3.2.1) prices in a month can be high or low. 
3.2 Input data 
The above described model versions are tested on a set of Swiss power plants participating in the Swiss 
spot and secondary balancing market. Following, the market and plant characteristics are shortly 
described. For a detailed explanation of the Swiss electricity market see Abrell (2016). 
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3.2.1 Market data 
The Swiss balancing market is split into three products; primary, secondary and tertiary reserve. The 
products main differentiation is based on their call-up time; i.e. how shortly they are activated after an 
imbalance between demand and supply occurred (Abrell, 2016). In this paper, we only study the 
secondary reserve (SRL) market. The Swiss SRL market has the following characteristics1 (Abrell, 
2016; Swissgrid AG, 2017): 
• Total procured balancing capacity: approx. 400MW 
• Product type: symmetric 
• Contract length: 1 week 
• Weekly tenders 
• Minimum bid: 5 MW 
• Capacity payment: Pay-as-bid  
• Energy payment: Day-ahead price +/- 20% 
SRL prices are published by the Swiss TSO (Swissgrid AG, 2019). Since these data include all prices 
per week which were accepted in the pay-as-bid procedure, we use the average of the accepted SRL 
prices per week in our analysis. In this paper, SRL prices are only used as benchmark for our simulated 
opportunity costs but are not required in the model. Prices which are required in the model are day-
ahead and intraday prices. Swiss day-ahead market prices are based on EPEXSPOT (2019) with the 
years 2013 to 2015 taken into account. Intraday market prices are also based on EPEXSPOT (2019). 
However, since we were not able to obtain the Swiss intraday price data German intraday prices are 
used instead. In addition, intraday markets are just considered for the years 2014 and 2015. Since the 
German intraday market is continuous, no single price per time step is available. Because of this, 
intraday prices used in this paper represent weighted average values. The prices used in this paper are 
summarized in Figure 4 by its monthly average values. 
Both price time series show a clear seasonal structure. Energy prices tend to peak during the winter 
months as Switzerland is import dependent in winter while it has an export surplus in summer and also 
because overall electricity demand in the continental European system (and also in Switzerland) is 
higher in winter than in summer. For the balancing prices the significant price spike in the spring months 
is the most striking feature. Identifying the reasons for this price structure is one of the main objectives 
of our analysis. 
 
                                                     
1 The market design of the Swiss SRL market changed in June 2018. In this paper, we consider the market design which was 
in place before June 2018.  
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Figure 4: Monthly average day-ahead and intraday prices (left axis); monthly average SRL prices 
(right axis). Data based on EPEXSPOT (2019) and Swissgrid AG (2019) 
 
Beside the price data, information on the day-ahead price uncertainty is required for the stochastic model 
version. To estimate the uncertainty, we calculate the deviations of the future prices from the day-ahead 
market prices. While positive and negative deviations of the future prices from the day-ahead market 
prices should be similar in the long term, we only have a look at the positive deviations here. For the 
yearly stochastic model, which is used to derive the water values for the weekly stochastic model, we 
use the average monthly deviation of the Phelix DE/AT Base Year Future (EEX, 2019) relative to the 
yearly base price of the day-ahead market. To derive the weekly uncertainty for the weekly stochastic 
model, we compare the Phelix DE/AT Base Week Future (EEX, 2019) with the weekly base price of 
the day-ahead market. Figure 5 illustrates the deviations. 
 
  
Figure 5: Deviation of yearly (left) and weekly (right) future prices from day-ahead prices. Data 
based on EEX (2019) and EPEXSPOT (2019) 
 
For the year (left figure), the deviations between the future prices and the day-ahead market prices show 
a clear downward trend. Uncertainty is decreasing with time since we get closer to the actual day-ahead 
market from one month to the other. In the yearly stochastic model, we use a linear estimate of the 
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observed downward trend as our assumption on price uncertainty (orange line). For a week (right figure), 
deviations are much more fluctuating. While there seems to be a downward trend in the deviation 
between future and day-ahead prices until Thursday, deviation increases again at the end of the week. 
However, the deviation is around 10% all over the week which is why we assume a constant price 
uncertainty of 10% in the weekly stochastic model. 
3.2.2 Hydropower data 
For our analysis of the opportunity cost of hydropower we have chosen a set of Swiss hydropower 
cascades as exemplary test cases. We focus on cascades which include storage hydropower plants. While 
some of the cascade also include run-of-river plants, cascades with pump-storage plants are not 
considered here. The chosen cascades differ in their topology, capacity and storage volume. Table 1 
summarizes the main characteristics of the chosen cascades. 
 
Table 1: Data of hydropower cascades.  
Cascade 
No. 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Avg. Production 
(GWh) 
Storage 
(Mio. m3) 
Number 
Plants/ 
Reservoirs 
Ratio 
Storage to 
Discharge
* 
Ratio 
Inflow to 
Storage* 
1 54 72 50 1/1 434 3 
2 56 214 20 2/2 556 7 
3 60 119 40 1/1 553 4 
4 104 318 6 3/2 199 17 
5 109 227 86 2/1 462 5 
6 201 702 62 5/3 998 3 
7 397 1’036 204 4/2 1’643 1 
8 439 925 111 3/3 1’489 2 
* Based on largest reservoir of the cascade. 
Data Sources: Balmer (2006), Garrison et al. (2018), Schlecht and Weigt (2014) and SFOE (2018). 
 
Some of the hydropower plants considered here are simple storage hydropower plants with a single 
reservoir and a single plant (i.e., cascade No. 1 and 3). Other cascades are more complex including up 
to five plants and three reservoirs (i.e., cascade No. 6). The cascades chosen in this paper should be 
representative for the whole population of Swiss storage hydropower plants. Approximately 15% of the 
Swiss storage hydropower plants are single-site plants while the remaining 85% belong to hydro 
cascades. Regarding turbine capacity, around 60% of Swiss storage hydropower plants have a capacity 
below 100MW, 30% a capacity between 100MW and 300MW and 10% a capacity above 300MW 
(Balmer, 2006; Garrison et al., 2018; Schlecht and Weigt, 2014; SFOE, 2018). 
In order to consider head effects in the technical model version, additional technical data is required. 
Since this kind of data is plant specific and rarely available at high degree of detail, we base our 
assumption on head data on a case study in Ticino, for which detailed data was provided within the 
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NRP70 project “The Future of Swiss Hydropower”2, and extrapolate this details to other plants 
considered in this paper. The resulting head-discharge-efficiency relation for one of the cascades (i.e., 
cascade No. 3) is illustrated in Table 2. Data for all other cascades for which head effects are considered 
can be found in the Appendix (A2). 
How relevant the head effects are is plant specific. We do not consider head effects for all plants in the 
sample. In case of a cascade, head effects are only considered for bigger storage plants. For smaller or 
low head plants we assume a constant head. Given the limited data availability, the resulting numerical 
model results should only be seen as indicative. 
 
Table 2: Head data for cascade No. 3 
 
 
High Head Mid Head Low Head 
Head (m) 372 364 356 
Power Block 1 (MW) 16 16 16 
Power Block 2 (MW) 33 32 31 
Power Block 3 (MW) 51 50 49 
Power Block 4 (MW) 60 59 57 
 
 
4 Results 
The results section follows the same structure as the model section. First, the results of the basic model 
are illustrated. Afterwards, the results for short-term trading options, head effects and price uncertainty 
are shown. In the results section, only the year 2015 is illustrated, the results for 2013 and 2014 are 
provided in the Appendix (A3). 
                                                     
2 https://fonew.unibas.ch/de/projects/finished-projects/nfp70-futurehydro/  
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4.1 Basic model 
In the Swiss SRL market, the minimum bid size is 5MW. However, beyond that minimum size, bids can 
be increased by 1MW (Swissgrid AG, 2017). We consider different bid sizes for each cascade, starting 
with the minimum bid up to a bid size equal to half of the turbine capacity of the plant which is 
responsible for reserving the water in its reservoir. Figure 6 shows the range of opportunity cost for SRL 
over all cascades and bid sizes resulting from the basic model in comparison to the average SRL prices 
for 2015. 
 
 
Figure 6: SRL price and maximum/ minimum opportunity costs of the sample cascades, 2015 
 
As illustrated in Figure 6, Swiss SRL prices (blue line) are driven by hydrological conditions. The most 
pronounced peak in the SRL prices occurs in spring when the reservoirs are empty and the snow melt 
has not started yet.3 As illustrated by the maximum opportunity cost (orange line), reserving water in 
the reservoir for SRL in spring comes at a high cost due to the low flexibility of hydropower at that time. 
For some cascades in the sample, the spring peak in the opportunity costs already occurs earlier, 
depending on the local inflow conditions and the resulting reservoir levels. Overall, the maximum 
opportunity costs reveal that the SRL prices seem to be driven by the opportunity costs of spot trades. 
However, the difference between the maximum and the minimum (grey line) opportunity costs shows a 
high cost variance. Depending on the specific hydropower cascade characteristics as well as the 
respective size of the SRL bid opportunity costs can range from levels close to zero to levels which are 
significantly above the SRL price level. In some weeks of the year, even maximum opportunity costs 
are lower than the observed market prices. This could result from the limited set of hydropower plants 
considered in this paper or from opportunity cost drivers, which have not been considered in the 
                                                     
3 See also other years in the Appendix (A3). In 2013, the SRL price peak in spring was especially high due to a prolonged 
winter and a consequent earlier reduction the in reservoir levels (ElCom, 2014).  
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simplified basic model. While we cannot address the first point in this paper, we have a closer look at 
the individual drivers of the opportunity costs in the following section. All further results are only 
illustrated for two of the cascades considered in this paper, a “single-site” plant (i.e., cascade No. 3) and 
a “multi-site” cascade (i.e., cascade No. 7). Results for the other plants and cascades can be found in the 
Appendix (A3.2). 
Following, we want to have a closer look at the impact of the size of the SRL bid on the opportunity 
costs for providing SRL. Figure 7 illustrates the effect for the single plant and the cascade.  
 
 
 
Figure 7: SRL price and opportunity costs for varying bid size, single-site (top), multi-site 
(bottom), 2015. 
 
Figure 7 shows the significant dependence of the opportunity costs on the size of the SRL bid. The 
higher the size of the SRL bid, the higher the opportunity cost for a marginal MW of SRL since a higher 
amount of water has to be reserved in order to be able to fulfill the reserve obligations. Especially in 
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spring the SRL prices seems to be significantly influenced by the bid size. While for a minimum bid 
size of 5MW, almost no spring peak in the opportunity costs can be observed, opportunity costs start to 
peak at higher bid sizes. Due to low reservoir levels in spring, providing higher amounts of SRL at that 
time leads to significant shifts in the hydropower operation schedule. 
Having a look at the different cascade characteristics, the multi-site (bottom figure) has much higher 
opportunity cost in spring compared to the single-site (top figure). Apart from spring, however, the 
single-site has higher opportunity costs than the multi-site. In general, our results confirm that larger 
cascades can provide SRL at lower opportunity costs (apart from spring). Since it is possible to bid a 
portfolio of plants into the SRL market, larger cascades can optimally split their reserve obligations 
among the plants of the cascade based on the respective costs of each plant. Some of the larger cascades 
also include run-of-river (RoR) plants. In times the inflows are high enough and RoR plants are running 
at full load anyway, they are able to provide the negative part of the SRL product at low costs. In spring 
when the inflows are low, RoR plants cannot contribute that much to the SRL obligations. At the same 
time, the reservoirs of the storage plants of the cascade are empty. This combination leads to high 
opportunity costs at higher bid sizes for larger cascades at that time. During spring, all multi-sites 
considered in this paper have similar or even higher opportunity costs at higher bid sizes than the single-
site plants (see also Appendix A3).  
4.2 Short-term trading options 
In reality, hydropower plants are not just traded on the day-ahead market but also on more short-term 
markets (i.e., intraday markets) in order to value their flexibility (see, e.g., Fodstad et al., 2018). Figure 8 
illustrates the impact of intraday markets on the opportunity cost for providing SRL for single- and 
multi-site plants for a bid size of 20MW. Figures on other bid sizes can be found in the Appendix (A3.2). 
 
 
Figure 8: SRL price and opportunity cost of single- and multi-site for a bid of 20MW, 2015 
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Comparing the opportunity cost for SRL with and without taking into account intraday trade shows that 
the short term trades have only a minor impact on the opportunity cost level. For single-site plants, 
generation schedules and corresponding opportunity cost for SRL are slightly changed. In most of the 
weeks, opportunity costs are slightly increased if the hydropower plant is optimizing short term trading 
compared to pure day-ahead market trade. Given that the model design for short term trading includes 
both, the possibility to trade on the day-ahead and intraday market, the resulting revenue in case of 
allowed short term trading must be at least as high as in the day-ahead only case or higher. The slightly 
higher opportunity costs reflect this logic. 
For the multi-site cascade, intraday markets seem to have no significant impact on the opportunity costs 
for SRL beside a reduction in the spring peak. As shown in the previous chapter, the spring peak in 
opportunity cost is mostly defined by storage plants along a cascade and the need to alter generation 
patterns in low storage weeks to fulfill the balancing requirements. As the intraday markets provide 
more trade opportunities they can reduce the negative impact of those shifts in production leading to the 
observed opportunity cost reduction. However, the overall opportunity cost level is also defined by 
inflexible plants of the cascade. For such plants, generation is mostly driven by hydrology and not by 
spot prices leaving their generation schedules unchanged even with changes in prices or trading options.  
4.3 Technical plant characteristics 
Since the basic model simplifies technical characteristics which have an impact on the generation 
schedule of storage plants, a mixed-inter model formulation is used to approximate the impact of head 
effects on the opportunity costs. Figure 9 shows a comparison of the opportunity costs for the basic 
model and the mixed-integer model for a bid size of 20MW for the year 2015. 
 
 
Figure 9: SRL price and opportunity cost of single- and multi-site for a bid of 20MW with and 
without head effects, 2015. 
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Having a look at Figure 9, the first thing that stands out is that the spring peak in the opportunity costs 
does not occur when taking into account head effects. This rather surprising effect is the result of 
changed operational incentives due to the relation between storage level and efficiency. Given that the 
amount of water does not change, a higher efficiency level translates into a higher energy output. 
Consequently, the plant operator has an incentive to operate the plant such that the head and 
correspondingly the turbine efficiency are maximized. Because of that, the storage reservoir is not fully 
emptied in spring as illustrated for the single-site in Figure 10 (see Appendix A3.2 for the multi-site). 4 
 
 
Figure 10: Storage level of the single-site for the basic model and the MIP with SRL bid of 20MW 
in week 17, 2015 
 
As is evident in Figure 10, when accounting for head effects the lowest storage level is increased to 
match the switch between the low and mid head level stage. At this boundary the efficiency levels jump 
(see Figure 2 and Table 2). This means a unit of water turbinated in the low head range produces less 
energy than one at the mid head range. This incentivizes the operator to keep more water in the storage 
and thereby also increases the flexibility for balancing provision as the reservoir restriction is already 
fulfilled due to the altered operation schedule. This in turn reduces the opportunity cost in spring. 
However, the complete disappearance of the spring peak in our case seems to be a model artifact 
resulting from our simplified approach and data on the head effects of the individual plants. In reality 
the head effects are continuous and not step-wise as in our model. Thus the extreme effect of avoiding 
to reduce the storage level beyond a specific threshold is a result of the model. However, the general 
incentive to keep the storage level higher to improve efficiency should remain valid. This would also 
lead to a slight reduction of the spring peak in opportunity costs. 
                                                     
4 Since the mixed-integer model is computationally demanding, only a limited number of cascades for a limited amount of bid 
sizes and years are calculated. 
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Apart from the spring peak, the overall opportunity costs are increased when taking into account head 
effects (see Figure 9). While this effect is especially visible for the single-site plant, it can only be 
observed in the first quarter of the year for the multi-site cascade. Since multi-site cascades include also 
small storage plants as well as RoR plants for which head effects are not considered in our model, the 
impact of head effects on the opportunity cost of multi-site cascades is rather small.  
4.4 Uncertainty in day-ahead market prices 
In the basic model we neglect any uncertainties. In the stochastic model version uncertainty of the day-
ahead prices is considered to test its impact on opportunity costs. Figure 10 illustrates this effect for an 
SRL bid of 20MW. Results on additional years, cascades and bid sizes can be found in the Appendix 
(A3.2). 
 
 
Figure 11: SRL price and opportunity cost of single- and multi-site for a bid of 20MW with and 
without price uncertainty, 2015 
 
As shown in Figure 11, uncertainty in the day-ahead market prices changes the opportunity costs for 
SRL for both, single- and multi-site plants. For the single-site plant the costs are increased in the second 
half of the year and lower in the first quarter of the year. The spring peak in the opportunity costs is 
relatively similar. For the multi-site plant, opportunity costs for SRL are slightly higher with price 
uncertainty in almost all weeks of the year (see Figure 11). However, as for the single-site plant 
opportunity costs of the multi-site plant significantly change in the second half of the year. Compared 
to the single-site plant, the spring peak in the opportunity costs of the multi-site plant is significantly 
lower than the deterministic spring peak.  
As illustrated in Figure 12, the single site hydropower plant is operated differently if price uncertainty 
is taken into account (see Appendix A3.2 for the multi-site).  
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Figure 12: Generation schedule for the single-site for basic and stochastic model with SRL bid of 
20MW in week 17, 2015 
 
While the changes in the generation schedule naturally lead to the changes in opportunity costs it is 
unclear what effects in particular drive the altered generation pattern. For example the long-term price 
uncertainty should have a higher impact at the beginning of the modeled year as the uncertainty level 
reduces over the months. On the other hand, the impact of the short-term uncertainty will depend on the 
price dynamic within the week; i.e. a rather flat price curve with 10% uncertainty will lead to a different 
operational schedule compared to a volatile price curve with the same average price level and 10% price 
uncertainty due to the more important role of price spikes for hydro operation. Overall, the impact of 
price uncertainty on opportunity costs is less straightforward than for the other tested effects. 
 
5 Interpretation and Discussion 
The objective of the model comparison is to understand what drives the price structure of the Swiss 
balancing prices, in particular the SRL prices. As illustrated in Figure 13, short-term trading options, 
head effects and price uncertainty all can have an impact on the opportunity costs and should thus be 
considered in analysing the opportunity costs and the corresponding SRL prices of a hydro-dominated 
electricity system.  
Our results indicate that apart from spring, single-site plants (Figure 13, top panel) are more influenced 
by these drivers than multi-site cascades (Figure 13, bottom panel) since multi-site cascades can split 
their reserve obligation among various plants and reservoirs. While our results indicate that all three 
drivers can influence the opportunity costs for providing SRL, we cannot clearly quantify the magnitude 
of this influence. Since the impact of these drivers on the opportunity costs can be site-specific, drawing 
any overall conclusion on the magnitude could be misleading. In addition, due to limited data 
availability, e.g., on site-specific head effects, our results may under- or overestimate the impact of a 
specific driver. While we only have a look at the individual effects of these drivers on the opportunity 
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costs, the combined effects could be much larger. However, there is a trade-off between analysing the 
combined effect of drivers on the opportunity costs for balancing capacity and considering a time 
horizon which is sufficiently long to capture market characteristics and hydrological conditions. This 
makes it computational challenging to derive a combined picture. 
 
 
 
Figure 13: SRL price and opportunity cost, SRL bid of 20MW, single-site (top), multi-site 
(bottom), 2015. 
 
The results also show that the dominant spring price peak in the Swiss system is a result of the 
seasonality of inflows and the requirement to keep enough water available for the call-up in the 
balancing market. This requires plant operator to reserve water which otherwise could obtain a high 
return on the spot market and thereby greatly increases the opportunity costs. The assessment of the 
different bid sizes shows that this effect is negligible for small bids but becomes decisive if larger 
capacity levels are bid into the balancing market. Given that the Swiss SRL market has a requested 
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overall capacity of 400MW at least some plants will need to provide larger bids thereby pushing up the 
price level. Running a less risk averse strategy by not reserving the full balancing energy (i.e. accounting 
for the rather small call-up probability of 6% in average) could reduce this price spike but naturally runs 
the risk of high penalty payments in case the balancing energy cannot be provided. 
As the models provide a competitive benchmark for the opportunity costs the results also indicate that 
the historic Swiss SRL prices can be justified by the underlying market constraints and technical 
characteristics of hydropower. As in the Norwegian case (Gebrekiros et al., 2013), we could show for 
Switzerland that providing balancing capacity could significantly alter optimal generation schedules of 
hydropower and that the resulting losses in profits are reflected in the balancing prices. While e.g., Heim 
and Goetz (2013) or Ocker and Ehrhart (2017) found balancing prices which deviate from the 
competitive level for the German SRL market, we cannot confirm this findings for the Swiss SRL market 
based on our method and data. This may results from the differences between the German and Swiss 
SRL markets regarding their market design, market structure or generation mix. Since the Swiss SRL 
demand is quite low but the number of hydropower firms which could satisfy demand quite high, there 
should be enough competition in the Swiss SRL market. In addition, while the German SRL market is 
dominated by conventional technologies, the Swiss SRL market is dominated by hydropower which 
makes Swiss SRL prices dependent on hydrological conditions (i.e. the spring price peak).  
Finally, according to our results, single-site plants or smaller cascades seem to have a bigger impact on 
the overall SRL price level (apart from spring), whereas larger cascades significantly influence the 
spring peak. However, in this paper, we only have a look at a limited number of Swiss hydropower 
cascades. Accordingly, our results depend on the specific characteristics of these cascades. Drawing 
conclusions about Swiss hydropower as a whole could be misleading. In addition, companies may bid 
bigger cascades into the balancing markets than the ones considered in this paper or even bid a portfolio 
of different technologies. This could lead to lower opportunity costs for balancing services than 
illustrated in this paper. However, we do not have any information on how many single-site hydropower 
plants, hydropower cascades or portfolios of different technologies are active in the Swiss balancing 
market in reality.  
 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we had a look at the balancing market prices of a hydro-dominated electricity system using 
Switzerland as a case study. By using a short-term hydropower operation model and a set of Swiss 
hydropower plants, we were able to identify a competitive benchmark for Swiss balancing market prices 
defined by the opportunity costs of hydropower for providing balancing capacity. Our results indicate 
that Swiss SRL market prices are not influenced by any market imperfections (e.g., market power) but 
can be justified by the opportunity cost of Swiss hydropower. Those are largely influenced by 
hydrological conditions and vary for different cascade structures. In addition, short-term trading options, 
head effects and price uncertainty have an influence on the opportunity cost level. However, due to 
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limitations of this paper, we are not able to exactly quantify the magnitude of the influence of these 
drivers and their potential interaction. This may be addresses in future research with more detailed data.  
Balancing markets differ in their design across countries (see e.g., Ocker et al., 2016). Because of this, 
the European Commission introduced a guideline for the harmonization of balancing markets (European 
Commission, 2017) in the course of the ongoing energy transition. The Swiss balancing market will 
likely also be adjusted in their design within the next years (see e.g.,  Swissgrid AG, 2018). Changes in 
the balancing market design may also change the opportunity cost of hydropower for providing 
balancing services and consequently the balancing market prices. The impact of a change in the Swiss 
balancing market design should be addresses in future research (i.e. see Schillinger 2019).  
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Appendix 
 
A1 Model Supplement 
 
A1.1 Technical plant characteristics   
The mixed-integer approach used in this paper for the approximation of head effects is based on Conejo 
et al. (2002). For plants and reservoirs along the cascade for which head effects are neglected (𝑖𝑖 = 𝑛𝑛ℎ 
or 𝑟𝑟 = 𝑛𝑛ℎ), the model is the same as the basic model. For plants and reservoirs along the cascade for 
which head effects are considered (𝑖𝑖 = ℎ or 𝑟𝑟 = ℎ), the basic model is adjusted.  
The objective of the plant operator is to maximize its weekly revenue in the day-ahead market taking 
into account the future value of water. The water values are derived from a yearly model assuming a 
constant head due to computational limitations. max𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = �𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 +  �𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒,𝑟𝑟
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒,𝑟𝑟 
The generation of each turbine is defined by the production equivalent (i.e., the water to energy 
conversion factor) 𝜂𝜂 and the water which is discharged through the turbine 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖. If no head effects are 
considered 𝜂𝜂 is assumed to be constant.  
𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 = 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖        ∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖 = 𝑛𝑛ℎ 
If head effects are considered, 𝜂𝜂 and the corresponding generation depends on the discharge and the 
head level. For each head level and for each discharge block (𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏) an Eta (𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏,1,2,3) is defined. The 
binary variables 𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡,1,2 are used to define the head level at which the plant is operating at a specific 
point in time. Compared to Conejo et al. (2002) we do not take into account a minimum generation level 
at which the plant has to be operated if it is running due to a lack of data. 
𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 −�𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏
𝑏𝑏
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏,1 − 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 � � (
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡,2)� ≤ 0        ∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖 = ℎ   
𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 −�𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏
𝑏𝑏
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏,1 + 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 � � (
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡,2)� ≥ 0        ∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖 = ℎ   
𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 −�𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏
𝑏𝑏
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏,2 − 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 � � (
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 1 − 𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡,2)� ≤ 0        ∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖 = ℎ   
𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 −�𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏
𝑏𝑏
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏,2 + 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 � � (
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 1 − 𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡,2)� ≥ 0        ∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖 = ℎ   
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𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 −�𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏
𝑏𝑏
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏,3 − 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 � � (
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 2 − 𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡,1 −  𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡,2)� ≤ 0        ∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖 = ℎ   
𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 −�𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏
𝑏𝑏
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏,3 + 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 � � (
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 2 − 𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡,1 −  𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡,2)� ≥ 0        ∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖 = ℎ   
The total discharge (𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖) is defined by the discharge over all discharge blocks. A minimum discharge 
level is not considered in this paper. 
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 =  �𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏
𝑏𝑏
       ∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖 = ℎ   
To define at which discharge level the plant is operating, the maximum discharge by block (𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚) and 
the binary variable (𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏), which is equal to 1 if the discharge exceeds the maximum discharge of a 
specific discharge block, are considered. 
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏=1 ≤  𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏=1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚         ∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖 = ℎ  
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏=1 ≥  𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏=1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏=1        ∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖 = ℎ  
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏 ≤  𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏−1        ∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖 = ℎ, 𝑏𝑏   
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏 ≥  𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏        ∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖 = ℎ, 𝑏𝑏   
The storage level in each hour for each reservoir is defined as in the basic model.  
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟 =  𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1,𝑟𝑟 + 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟 − � 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 − � 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 + � 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟  + � 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟         ∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟 
Following Conejo et al. (2002) the head level is approximated by the storage level. Thus, different 
storage intervals belong to specific head levels. The following three equations define at which head level 
the plant is operating at a specific point in time based on the lower (𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙) and upper (𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚) storage bound 
and the binary variable 𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡,1,2. If both 𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡,1 and 𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡,2 are equal to zero, the storage level is between the 
minimum storage level and the lower bound. This range belongs to a low head. If 𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡,1 is equal to one 
and 𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡,2 equal to zero, the plant is operating at the intermediate head level. If both binary variables are 
equal to one, the storage level belongs to a high head. 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟 ≥  𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡,1 −  𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡,2� + 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡,2         ∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟 = ℎ 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟 ≤  𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡,2 + 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�1 − 𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡,1�+ 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚(𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡,1 −  𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡,2)         ∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟 = ℎ 
𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡,1 ≥  𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡,2        ∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟 = ℎ 
For plants for which no head effects are considered, the generation capacity is constrained by the 
minimum and maximum generation. For plants for which head effects are considered, this constraint is 
already included in the previous equations.  
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𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒  ≤ 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 ≤  𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚       ∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖 = 𝑛𝑛ℎ 
As in the basic model, the generation is constrained by the SRL bid if the plant is active on the SRL 
market. The minimum generation level has to be increased by the SRL bid while the maximum 
generation level is decreased by the SRL bid. While we assume a minimum generation level of zero, the 
maximum generation for plants for which head effects are considered depends on the respective head 
level. At different head levels different amounts of energy can be produced. Thus, the maximum 
generation of a plant for which head effects are considered (𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖=ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚) is adjusted by the difference in the 
maximum generation between consecutive head levels (𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖=ℎ,1,2max𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓). For plants for which head effects 
are neglected, this can be ignored. 
𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒  + 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 ≤ 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡
≤  �(𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖=𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖=ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖=ℎ,1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 � (𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟=ℎ,𝑡𝑡,1 − 1
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖=ℎ,𝑟𝑟=ℎ )𝑖𝑖+ 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖=ℎ,2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 � (𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟=ℎ,𝑡𝑡,2 − 1
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖=ℎ,𝑟𝑟=ℎ ) ) −  𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠         ∀𝑡𝑡 
In order to be able to deliver what was bid into the balancing market in terms of energy, water has to be 
reserved in the reservoir. While these constraints are almost equivalent to the basic model formulation, 
the amount of water which has to be reserved in the reservoir is defined by the average conversion factor 
at low head (𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,1). This ensures that independent of the head level, enough water is stored in the 
reservoir to be able to deliver the SRL bid in terms of energy. 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒,𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟  ≥  ( 2 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,1𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠)𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 −  𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒        ∀𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = ℎ 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟  ≥  𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,1𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 �𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 − 𝑡𝑡� −  𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒        ∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = ℎ 
In addition to the storage constraints resulting from balancing market participation, the storage is 
constrained by its minimum and maximum storage level. While the maximum storage level for plants 
for which head effects are considered is already defined by previous equations, it needs to be considered 
for plants for which head effects are neglected. In addition, the storage level has to be greater or equal 
the minimum storage level. In our case, the minimum storage level is assumed to be zero. 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟 ≥ 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒      ∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟 ≤  𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚       ∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟 = 𝑛𝑛ℎ 
The storage level in the first hour is given either by historic data, if it is the first week of the year or in 
any other week of the year, by the storage end level of the previous week. 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡=1,𝑟𝑟 =  𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡        ∀𝑡𝑡 = 1, 𝑟𝑟 
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For additional details on the mixed-integer model formulation see Conejo et al. (2002). 
 
A1.2 Uncertainty in day-ahead market prices   
To take into account uncertainty in the day-ahead market prices, a stochastic model is formulated. 
Details on stochastic modeling can be found, e.g., in Conejo et al. (2010) or Ladurantaye et al. (2009). 
The stochastic model applied in this paper is similar to the basic model formulation but defined on nodal 
basis. As described in section 3.1.4, each node belongs to a day of the week while each day has 24 hours. 
The objective of the plant operator is to maximize its weekly revenue in the day-ahead market taking 
into account the future value of water. With probability 𝜋𝜋𝑒𝑒 a node belongs to a high or low price 
realization. To take into account the future value of water the storage level 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒=𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓,𝑟𝑟 and the water value 
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒=𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓,𝑟𝑟 for each reservoir 𝑟𝑟 at the end of the week (𝑛𝑛 = 𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙) are taken into account. The water 
values are derived from a stochastic yearly model. However, due to the time intensive solution process 
when taking into account price uncertainty, the yearly model considers price uncertainty only on a 
monthly basis (see chapter 3.1.4). 
𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = �𝜋𝜋𝑒𝑒 � 𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡 + �𝜋𝜋𝑒𝑒=𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒=𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓,𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒,𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒=𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓,𝑟𝑟 
The generation of each turbine, node and hour is defined by the production equivalent (i.e., water to 
energy conversion factor) 𝜂𝜂 and the water which is discharged through the turbine 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖. Each hour is 
mapped to the respective nodes by 𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡. As in the basic model, no head effects are considered. 
𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 = 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖        ∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛 𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡 
The storage level at each node for each reservoir is defined by the storage level at the parent node 
(𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒=𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟), the natural water inflows into the reservoir 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟, the water which is going out of the 
reservoir either by discharging 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 or spilling 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 it via the turbine below the reservoir 𝑖𝑖 and the 
water which is ending up in the reservoir by discharge or spill from a turbine above the reservoir 𝑖𝑖. 
Compared to the basic model, the storage level is defined on daily basis (i.e., each node belongs to a day 
of the week) instead of hourly basis.  
𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒,𝑟𝑟 =  � 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒=𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒,𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 + � (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟 − � 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 − � 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 + � 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟  + � 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 )        ∀𝑟𝑟,𝑛𝑛 
The generation of each turbine, node and hour is constrained by the turbine capacity 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 as well as 
the minimum generation level 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒. As in the basic model, the minimum generation is assumed to be 
zero. 
𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒  ≤ 𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 ≤  𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚       ∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖,𝑛𝑛 𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡 
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If a hydropower plant bids capacity into the weekly symmetric SRL market its minimum and maximum 
capacity is constrained by the SRL bid. As in the basic model, the constrained is related to the total 
cascade generation and not the generation of the individual plants of the cascade.  
𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒  +  𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 ≤ 𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡 ≤  𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 −  𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠         ∀𝑡𝑡,𝑛𝑛 𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡 
In order to be able to deliver what was bid into the balancing market in terms of energy, water has to be 
reserved in the reservoir in the weeks before the week for which capacity was bid into the SRL market 
as well as in the contracted week. 
𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒,𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟  ≥  (2 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠)𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 −  𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒        ∀𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟,𝑛𝑛 𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡=𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 
𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒,𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟  ≥  𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 �𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 − 𝑡𝑡� −  𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒        ∀𝑛𝑛, 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡 
In addition, the storage is constrained by its minimum and maximum storage level and the storage at the 
beginning of the week is defined by the storage start value.  
𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒,𝑟𝑟 ≤  𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚        ∀𝑟𝑟,𝑛𝑛 
𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒,𝑟𝑟 =  𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡        ∀𝑛𝑛, 𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡=𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 
For additional details on the stochastic model formulation see, e.g., Conejo et al. (2010) or Ladurantaye 
et al. (2009). 
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A2 Data Supplement 
 
Table A 1: Head data for cascades for which head effects are considered 
Cascade No. 1 3 6 7 
Power high head block 1 (MW) 15 16 17 38 
Power high head block 2 (MW) 29 33 34 75 
Power high head block 3 (MW) 46 51 54 118 
Power high head block 4 (MW) 54 60 63 138 
Power mid head block 1 (MW) 14 16 16 33 
Power mid head block 2 (MW) 28 32 33 66 
Power mid head block 3 (MW) 43 50 51 104 
Power mid head block 4 (MW) 51 59 60 122 
Power low head block 1 (MW) 13 16 16 29 
Power low head block 2 (MW) 26 31 31 58 
Power low head block 3 (MW) 41 49 49 90 
Power low head block 4 (MW) 48 57 57 106 
Discharge Block 1 (m3/s) 10 6 5 10 
Discharge Block 2 (m3/s) 18 11 9 20 
Discharge Block 3(m3/s) 28 17 14 30 
Discharge Block 4 (m3/s) 32 20 17 35 
High Head (m) 190 372 480 489 
Mid Head (m) 179 364 460 432 
Low Head (m) 167 356 439 375 
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A3 Results Supplement 
 
A3.1 Model Structure Comparison 
While using a weekly model with water values instead of a yearly model with predefined storage values 
at the beginning and end of the year, some differences, e.g., regarding the storage levels or the revenues, 
already occur from changes in the model structure. Figure A 1 compares the storage level from the 
yearly and the weekly model and shows the differences for the single-site (i.e., cascade No. 3). In 
addition, differences in the weekly revenues are illustrated. Overall the differences are rather limited. 
 
 
 
Figure A 1: Comparison of storage level and weekly revenue for yearly and weekly model 
structures. 
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A3.2 Additional Results 
Following we provide result figures for the cases not directly presented in the paper. 
 
 
Figure A 2: Storage level of the biggest reservoir of the multi-site for the basic model and the MIP 
with SRL bid of 20MW in week 17, 2015 
 
 
Figure A 3: Generation schedule for the multi-site for basic and stochastic model with SRL bid of 
20MW in week 17, 2015 
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Figure A 4: SRL price and opportunity costs for varying bid size, 2013 (top), 2014 (bottom), 2015. 
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Figure A 5: SRL price and opportunity cost by size of SRL bid for 2013. 
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Figure A 6: SRL price and opportunity cost by size of SRL bid for 2014. 
 
Figure A 7: SRL price and opportunity cost by size of SRL bid for 2015. 
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Figure A 8: SRL price and opportunity cost by model and bid size for cascade 1 for 2013. 
 
Figure A 9: SRL price and opportunity cost by model and bid size for cascade 1 for 2014. 
 
Figure A 10: SRL price and opportunity cost by model and bid size for cascade 1 for 2015. 
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Figure A 11: SRL price and opportunity cost by model and bid size for cascade 2 for 2013. 
 
Figure A 12: SRL price and opportunity cost by model and bid size for cascade 2 for 2014. 
 
Figure A 13: SRL price and opportunity cost by model and bid size for cascade 2 for 2015. 
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Figure A 14: SRL price and opportunity cost by model and bid size for cascade 3 for 2013. 
 
Figure A 15: SRL price and opportunity cost by model and bid size for cascade 3 for 2014. 
 
Figure A 16: SRL price and opportunity cost by model and bid size for cascade 3 for 2015. 
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Figure A 17: SRL price and opportunity cost by model and bid size for cascade 4 for 2013. 
 
 
Figure A 18: SRL price and opportunity cost by model and bid size for cascade 4 for 2014. 
 
 
Figure A 19: SRL price and opportunity cost by model and bid size for cascade 4 for 2015. 
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Figure A 20: SRL price and opportunity cost by model and bid size for cascade 5 for 2013. 
 
Figure A 21: SRL price and opportunity cost by model and bid size for cascade 5 for 2014. 
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Figure A 22: SRL price and opportunity cost by model and bid size for cascade 5 for 2015. 
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Figure A 23: SRL price and opportunity cost by model and bid size for cascade 6 for 2013. 
 
Figure A 24: SRL price and opportunity cost by model and bid size for cascade 6 for 2014. 
 
Figure A 25: SRL price and opportunity cost by model and bid size for cascade 6 for 2015. 
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Figure A 26: SRL price and opportunity cost by model and bid size for cascade 7 for 2013. 
 
Figure A 27: SRL price and opportunity cost by model and bid size for cascade 7 for 2014. 
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Figure A 28: SRL price and opportunity cost by model and bid size for cascade 7 for 2015. 
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Figure A 29: SRL price and opportunity cost by model and bid size for cascade 8 for 2013. 
 
Figure A 30: SRL price and opportunity cost by model and bid size for cascade 8 for 2014. 
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Figure A 31: SRL price and opportunity cost by model and bid size for cascade 8 for 2015. 
 
